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TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US

SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 24, 2010

REF: MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-076.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 23, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

¶3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on February 23, chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides continued the discussion of the U.S.-proposed Section VII of Part Five to the Protocol related to Type-2 inspections. It was very clear that the sides were still far apart on the concept for Type-2 inspections at Conversion or Elimination (CorE) facilities. The Russian side held to its position that at (CorE) facilities only converted or eliminated items would be subject to inspection whereas the U.S. view was that a Type-2 inspection at such facilities must also include the right to confirm the accuracy of data about systems declared to be located at such a facility. The Russian side also made it clear that the now expired START site diagram for the Votkinsk Elimination Facility would be reduced and only the open viewing area where eliminated items are placed for National Technical Means (NTM) viewing would be included and made subject to inspection, thus negating the ability to inspect non-deployed missiles being prepared for elimination in the large building that used to be included on the site diagram. End Summary.

¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Reviewing the Bidding; Type-2 Inspections

are Still not Just About CorE; Confusion over Type-2 Inspections for Conversion; Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Interceptors not Part of Type-2 Inspections; and Still Far Apart on Full Type-2 Inspections.

REVIEWING THE BIDDING

¶15. (S) Warner began the meeting by reminding Ilin that Section VII of Part Five to the Protocol dealt with all Type-2 inspections and CorE inspections were a subset of Type-2 inspections. As a result, the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text contained elements for both confirming the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and data specified for facilities on the numbers and types of items of inspection as well as confirming that items had been converted or eliminated in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of the Protocol. He also noted that CorE inspections would count against the annual quota for Type-2 inspections.

¶16. (S) Ilin acknowledged that CorE inspections would be Type-2 inspections and count against the quota. He noted that the Russian side had reviewed the U.S.-proposed text and pointed out that there

was a need to include various elements from the agreed statement related to the conversion of B-1 heavy bombers to a conventional role as well as the agreed statement on SSGNs. He also emphasized the need to include text related to the conversion of silo launchers into launchers of anti-missile defense systems or interceptors and pointed out that the U.S.-proposed text did not fully take into account the Russian proposal.

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Type-2 inspections are still not just about core

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¶17. (S) Warner began a discussion of the first paragraph of the text. The first part of the paragraph was related to the locations where Type-2 inspections could be conducted as well the purpose of such inspections which is to confirm the declared data in Part Two of the Protocol. The U.S.-proposed text added the additional right to confirm that items had been converted or eliminated if such items were present at a facility. He explained that this additional text was necessary to complete the picture for a full Type-2 inspection at any appropriate facility.

¶18. (S) Ilin stated that the additional text was not needed and that the Russian-proposed text included the idea that inspectors could confirm the elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as mobile ICBM launchers. Warner acknowledged that was true but the text needed to be expanded to include the conversion of heavy bombers as stated in the U.S. approach. Ilin opined that if that was the case, text from the agreed statement on the conversion of B-1 heavy bombers should be included. Warner explained that the concept of B-1 heavy bomber conversion was captured in paragraph 2 (a) of the U.S.-proposed text which dealt with inspections of formerly declared facilities which was where such inspections would be conducted but that the paragraph would need to be expanded to include the "right to conduct inspections at eliminated air bases to confirm that designated converted B-1 heavy bombers were incapable of employing nuclear armaments as stated in the First

Agreed Statement."

¶9. (S) Ilin expressed concern about specifically mentioning B-1 bombers since he understood that the United States was interested in converting B-52H heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments in the future and when that process began the Protocol would have to be changed. Warner agreed that it might be best just to refer to converted heavy bombers in general rather than specifying the B-1. Ilin agreed with Warner in principle stating that the Russian-proposed text could be combined to include heavy bomber conversion. As a result of the discussion Ilin bracketed CorE facilities in paragraph 1 as U.S.-proposed text to clarify the Russian position that the confirmation of declared data would not be allowed during CorE Type-2 inspections. Both sides agreed to reformulate their versions of the text for future discussion.

CONFUSION OVER TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS FOR CONVERSION

¶10. (S) Warner moved to paragraph 2(b) of the U.S.-proposed text

explaining that this was where the concept of conducting Type-2 inspections at ICBM bases and submarine bases to confirm the elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs and the conversion of SLBM launchers was found. He explained that the U.S. proposal also included the idea that at such facilities during this Type-2 inspection no other items or portions of the facility would be subject to inspection.

¶11. (S) Ilin incorrectly pointed out that a Type-2 inspection should also be used to confirm that a converted SLBM launcher had not been reconverted to allow it to launch an SLBM. Warner carefully explained that the Type-2 inspection at a submarine base was intended to confirm the initial conversion of the SLBM launcher. If the Russian side thought it was necessary to allow for confirmation that the SLBM launchers had not been reconverted then that inspection should be added to a Type-1 inspection and Section VI of the Protocol would need to be adjusted. Ilin agreed in principle and acknowledged that Section VI would have to be adjusted.

ABM INTERCEPTERS NOT PART OF TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS

¶12. (S) Warner turned to the Russian-proposed text which referenced the inspection of silo launchers at ICBM bases that had been converted to launch ABM interceptors. Beyond the fact that the United States strongly disagreed that such silos would be subject to inspection, he explained that these silos were not part of an ICBM base but were contained within the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility (SLF) and the entire facility was not subject to any type of inspection. Ilin asked which of the launchers containing ABM interceptors launched objects into space since this was the purpose of a SLF. Warner repeated that the United States was strongly opposed to the Russian position on this topic.

STILL FAR APART ON FULL TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS

¶13. (S) Warner shifted the focus of the meeting to the Russian proposal not to allow the inspection of the entire CorE facility during a Type-2 inspection in order to confirm the declared data for the facility. He reemphasized the U.S. approach that a Type-2 inspection at a CorE facility would serve two purposes. First, to confirm the data provided in Part Two of the Protocol and provided during the pre-inspection briefing and second, to confirm the conversion or elimination of items if they were present. Ilin referred back to the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow (Reftel) stating that it was agreed that the focus of these inspections was only to confirm the elimination of items. Warner reminded him that even before the meetings in Moscow the sides had agreed that Core facilities would be subject to full Type-2 inspections and both non-deployed items as well as eliminated items would be subject to inspection. In the case of Votkinsk, for example, this would include the inspection of both the building where missiles were prepared for elimination as well as the open viewing area in front of the building.

¶14. (S) Smirnov placed a piece of paper on the table which depicted the now expired START site diagram of the Votkinsk CorE facility. It clearly showed that the boundary of the inspection site had been reduced and was now drawn around only the open viewing area. He explained that the processing building would be declared to be a portion of the Votkinsk Production Facility, which is not subject to inspection under START Follow-on. Consequently, the site diagram for the facility would be redrawn and would contain only the open viewing area where the eliminated missiles would be located. Ilin noted that no non-deployed items would be inspected since the missile preparation building would not be included on the site diagram. Both sides recognized that serious disagreement still existed on this point.

¶15. (U) Documents provided: None

¶16. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner

Mr. Albertson (RO)

Mr. Brown

Mr. Buttrick

Maj Johnson

Mr. McConnell

Ms. Purcell

Mr. Rust

Mr. Smith

Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin

Col Izrazov

Mr. S. Shevchenko

Mr. Smirnov

Ms. Vodopolova

Ms. Shustiva (Int)

¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING